THE

AMERICAN LAW REGISTER,
SEPTEMBER 1883.
EXPRESS WARRANTIES IN SALES OF PERSONAL
PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES
AND CANADA.
WE have recently examined the law relating to the subject of the
"Warranties implied in Sales of Personal Property in the United
States and Canada," (22 Am. Law Reg. 85), and it is now intended
to consider the legal principles that are applicable to the subject
of express warranties, as laid down by the American and Canadian
courts, in sales of a similar nature, the English authorities being
ably reviewed by Mr. Benjamin, Q. C., in his work on Sales.
It will be convenient to examine the subject of express warranties
with reference to,
I.

THE PARTIES TO THE CONTRACT OF WARRANTY;

PRINCIPAL

AND AGENT.

(a) Creation of the contract of warranty by the agent.
(b) -Effect of the contract of warranty on the parties.
(c) Scope of the agent's authority to warrant.
I.

THE CONTRACT OF WARRANTY.

(a) Sales.
(b) Exchanges.
III. THE REMEDIES OF THE PARTIES.

(a) Remedies of the buyer; avoidance of the contract for
fraud of the seller.
(b) Action for breach of warranty.
IV. MEASURE OF DAMAGE.
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I. Tim PARTIES; PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

Any one, as a general rule, who can make a valid contract of
sale, may likewise make the collateral contract of warranty,
and, for the principles of law applicable to the parties to a contract of sale; the reader is referred to some treatise on sales,
as for example, the very valuable work of Mr. Benjamin, at
Chapter II.
A contract of warranty, however, may be made by the agent of
the principal, as well as by the principal himself, and we shall
endeavor to present the principles which are contained in the cases
relative to the subject of agency in connection with warranties.
(a) The creation of the contract of warranty.-The agency in
a contract of warranty is created in pretty much the same manner
as in. a contract of sale, and it has been repeatedly held that the
mere authority to sell implies also the power to warrant, on the
ground that when authority is given to do an act, it includes the
power to do everything usual and necessary to the accomplishment
of it: Skinner v. Gunn, 9 Porter (Ala.) 306; Bradford v. Bush,
10 Ala. 390; Gaines v. McKinley, 1 Id. 446; Boothby v. Scales,
27 Wise. 635; -Ezell v. Pranklin,2 Sneed (Tenn.) 236; Lane v.
-Dudley, 2 Murphy (N. C.) 119; Peters v. Barnsworth, 15 Yt.
155; Woodford v. AtcClenahan, 4 Gil. (Ill.) 85; Hurray v.
Brooks, 41 Iowa 45 ; _andall v. Kehlor, 60 Me. 37 ; Palmer v.
Hatch, 46 Mo. 585; H1unter v. Jameson, 6 Ired. (N. C.) 252;
Nelson v. Cowing, 6 Hill 336. In some cases, however, a distinction has been taken between a general and special power of
agency with respect to warranties, and it has been occasionally
decided that a naked authority given to a special agent to sell does
not imply a power to warrant also ; though the cases conflict.
One of the earliest American cases upon the subject is Lane v.
-Dudley,2 Murphy (N. C.) 119 [1812], in which it was said, by
TAYLOR, 0. J., citing a dictum of ASIHURST, J., in Penn v.
H7arrison, 3 T. R. 757, that an authority to warrant a horse is
within the scope of an authority to sell.

In Skinner v. Gunn, 9 Porter (Ala.) 305 [1839], the court
intimated the same thing, and cited Tenn v. Hfarrison, supra;

Relyear v. Hawke, 5 Esp. 72, and Alexander v. Gibson, 2 Campb.
555. After this, came Gaines v. .McKinley, 1 Ala. 446; Cocke
v. Campbell, 13 Ala. 286, and Bradford v. Bush, 10 Ala. 386;
approving the principles of the above decision.
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In Tice v. Gallup, 2 Hun (N. Y.) 446, the court held that a
special agent authorized to sell a horse might warrant its age, &c,
and in -Ezell v. Franklin, 2 Sneed (Tenn.) 236, the authority to
sell a slave was held to include the power to warrant, and Fenn v.
Harrison,was cited.
In Nelson v. Cowing 6 Hill (N. Y.) 836 [1844], the same rule
was adopted; BRoNsoN, J., said : "But a warranty-and jo of a
representation-is one of the usual means for effecting the sale of
a chattel; and when the owner sells by an agent, it may be presumed in the absence of all proof to the contrary, that the agent
has been clothed with all the usual powers for accomplishing the
proposed end. So long as the agent is acting within the general
scope of his authority, persons dealing with him are considered as
dealing with the principal. I will not stop to inquire whether,
David is to be regarded as a general or special agent; for if he
was only a special agent, his authority to warrant the quality or
condition of the thing sold would be presumed until the contrary
appeared: Fenm v. Harrison, 4 T. R. 177; Sandford v. Handy,
23 Wend. (N. Y.) 260." See also Peters v. -arnsworth, 15 Vt.
160, and Upton v. Suffolk Co., &c., 11 Cush. (Mass.) 586.
In Bryant v. Moore, 26 Me. 84, however, a warranty of oxen
by a special agent was held to be invalid as against the principal.
And in Croom v. Shaw, 1 Florida 216, the court said: "Oliver
in this case seems to have acted as a special agent of Croom, and
not as a general agent. He had, as would appear by the evidence,
a power to sell, but there is nothing to show that he had authority
to warrant."
In Cooley v. Perrine, 12 Yroom (N. J.) 322 [1879], the
subject was discussed at considerable length by DixoN, J., who
held that a special agent authorized to sell a horse, was not, in
consequence, empowered to make a warranty as to his soundness.
The court said, the agent "was clearly only a special agent, * * *
his instructions were to sell a certain horse to a designated person
at a fixed price. Herein, the only term subject to any appearance of ambiguity or indefiniteness, was the direction to sell. * * *
A sale of a chattel is a transfer of its title by the vendor to
the vendee for a price paid or promised : I Parsons on Contracts,
519. A direction to sell, therefore, nothing more appearing,
would confer upon a special agent no authority beyond that of
agreeing with the purchaser, in regard to these component partita-
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lars. Under certain circumstances a sale legally imports more
than these particulars, and in such cases the authority under a
power to sell would be correspondingly enlarged. Thus, if a sale
be made by sample, it is thereby impliedly warranted that the bulk
is of as good a quality as the sample. Hence, it has been properly
held, that where a broker was empowered to sell goods which were
in bulk, and, by the custom of brokers, it was permissible Oto sell
such goods by sample, and he was not restricted as to the mode of
sale, his sale by sample, and the warranty of quality therein
implied, was binding upon his principal. The Monte Allegre, 9
Wheat. 616; Andrews v. Kneeland, 6 Cowen 354; Schuchardt
v. Allen&, 1 Wall. 359. But in the sale of a horse, subject to the
buyers' inspection, no warrant5 of quality is implied, and it seems
a short and clear deduction of reasoning thence to conclude that
in an authority to make such a sale, no authority so to warrant is
implied. The warranty is outside of the sale, and he who is
empowered to make the warranty must have some other power than
that to sell." And the learned judge, in conclusion, said that all
the cases the other way, so far as he was aware, rested on the
authority of Penn v. Rarrison,supra; Helyear v. H-awke, supra;
and Alexander v. Gibson, supra, and "they no longer have any
foundations on authority-since these three cases, if they ever
applied to a special agency, are now in that respect distinctly overruled by Brady v. Todd, 9 0. B. (N. S.) 592; a decision foreshowed by CRESSWELL, J., when in Coleman v. Biches, 16 C. B.
104, [18553, he asked counsel, citing 2 Camp. 555, ' would you
hold that to be good law at the present day.'" In such conflict
of opinion, it is difficult to lay down a rule. Where one acts in a
representative capacity as a sheriff or auctioneer, no authority to
warrant is implied. Thus in Mink v. Jarvis, 8 U. C. Q. B. 397,
the question arose as to whether the sheriff's deputy could bind
his principal by a warranty that the goods belonged to the debtor,
on a writ of fieri facia&. The court thought he could not, but
were doubtful.
In Blood v. French, 9 Gray (Mass.) 198, BIGELOW, J., said:
Cwe doubt, whether in an ordinary sale of goods by auction, an
auctioneer virtute officii, has any right or authority to warrant
goods sold by him, in the absense of any express authority from
his principal to do so, and without proof of some' known and
established usage of trade, from which an authority can be implied.
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However this may be, we are clear that he has no such
authority in a case like this, where he acts as agent for an administrator in selling the goods of his intestate. The nature of the sale
and the representative capacity in which the vendor acts in
employing the auctioneer, preclude any implied right or authority
in the latter to make a warranty, binding on the administrator
personally, of the soundness of the article sold."
Sometimes the right of the agent to warrant is implied from a
usage of the trade: The Monte Allegre, 9 Wheat. 616; Andrews
v. Kneeland, 6 Cowen (N. Y.) 354; Pearson v. Stoddard, 9 Gray
(Mass.) 199 ; but such usage must be a reasonable one before the
agent's right to warrant will be implied ; as for example, in Dodd
v. Parlow, 11 Allen (Mass.) 426, where the court held, a usage that
gives a broker an implied authority to warrant goods sold by him to
be of a merchantable quality is inadmissible, and BIGELOW, C. J.,
remarked: "It is liable to the grave objection that it is unreasonable, and so contrary to the ordinary rules by which the relation
of principal and agent is regulated, that it cannot be presumed to
have been in contemplation of a vendor in employing a broker to
make a sale of merchandise. Even if the usage was known to the
vendor, he would have a right to disregard it, and disavow a contract made in conformity to it." See also Biddle on Stock Brokers,
at page 94.
If one acts in behalf of another, it is immaterial as respects
third parties, whether he does so by the direction or request of the
principal, or by his permission merely: Pay et al. v. Richmond, 43
Vt. 25; and the principal is bound, if he ratify the acts of his
agent which were not commanded originally by him to be performed: Churehill v. Palmer, 115 Mass. 311; Hill v. North, 34
Vt. 604; Lane v. Dudley, 2 Murphy (N. C.) 119; Guilford v.
Ashbaugqh, 44 Iowa 519.
(b) -Effect of the contract of warranty on the parties.-In a
contract of warranty the principal is bound by the statements and
representations of his agent, acting within the scope of his
authority: Williamson v. Candaley, 3 Ired. (N. C.) 349; .Ezell
v. Franklin, 2 Sneed (Tenn.) 242; and in the case of a private
agency the agent's warranty is binding on the parties, if a usual
one in the trade in which he is engaged (see cases supra), even if he
violate therein the secret instructions of his employer: Bryant v.
Xoore, 26 Me. 87 [1847]; Boothby v. Scales, 27 Wise. 635
*

*

*
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[1878]. Where a warranty is made by the agent for an undisclosed
principal, a suit will lie in the latter's name agaifist the purchaser:
1uiz v. -rorton, 4 Cal. 355; but if the agent covenant in his
own name, and does not attempt to bind his principal during the
treaty of sale, the latter will not be liable to the purchaser on the
warranty unless he afterwards ratify it: Skinner v. Gunn, 9
Porter (Ala.) 308. Where the agent makes a false warranty,
beyond the scope of his instructions, the principal by a ratification
of it, renders himself liable to the purchaser, though not to the
agent, unless the latter can show deceit on the principal's part:
Croom v. Shaw, 1 Fla. 217. It is obvious that the fact of the
agency must very clearly appear before the court will admit the
representations or undertakings of the agent in evidence: Applegate v. Illfoffitt, 60 Ind. 104; Skinner v. Gunn, supra.
(e) Scope of the agent's authority to warrant.-Where the
agent's instructions empower him to bind his principal by a
warranty, it must appear that he has acted strictly within the scope
of his authority-express or implied-before the warranty will be
held valid.
Thus in Upton v. Suffolk Co. 1]1ills, 11 Cushing (Mass.) 586,
a general selling agent in Boston, warranted in the name of his
principal that four thousand quarter barrels of flour sold by him
would be of such a character as to "insure its keeping sound on a
voyage to San Francisco," and it was held that the authority of
the agent to sell did not authorize his making such a hazardous
warranty, that the flour should keep sound during a long sea
voyage, in which it must twice cross the equator. METCALF, J.,
remarked, "what is the extent of the implied authority of a
general selling agent ? *

*

*

When one authorizes another

to sell goods, he is presumed to authorize him to sell in the usual
manner, and only in the usual manner, in which goods or things
of that sort are sold: Story on Agency, § 60 ; see Shaw v. Stone,
1 Cush. 228. The usage of the business in which a general agent
is employed furnishes the rule by which his authority is measured.
Hence, a general selling agent has authority to sell on credit, and
to warrant the soundness of the article sold, when such is the
usage: Goodenow v. Tyler, 7 Mass. 36; Alexander v. Gibson, 2
Campb. 555; Nelson v. Cowing, 6 Hill 836; 2 Kent Com. (6th
ed.) 622; Russell on Factors 58; Smith on Master and Servant
128, 129. But as stocks and goods sent to auction are not usually
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sold on credit, a stockbroker or auctioneer has no authority so to
sell them, unless he has the owner's express direction or consent:
Wiltshire v. Sims, 1 Campb. 258; 3 Chit. Law of Com. and Man.
205 ; 1 Bell Com. 388 ; and it w'as said by Mr. Justice Tno iPsoN,
(9 Wheat. 647), that auctioneers have only authority to sell, and
not to warrant, unless specially instructed so to do. As there is
no evidence nor suggestion of a usage to sell flour with the
hazardous warranty that it shall keep sweet during a sea voyage, in
which it must twice cross the equator, we deem it quite clear that
nothing short of an express authority conferred on the agent, would
empower him to bind them by such a warranty."
In Palmer v. Eatch, 46 Mo. 585, the selling agent warranted
against a seizure by the government under the revenue laws. The
court, while admitting the doctrine of the right of the selling
agent to warrant the quality or condition of the article sold, said:
"But the warranty counted upon in the plaintiff's petition, as we
have seen, is not of that character; it extends to and assumes to
warrant the plaintiffs against gratuitous and unwarrantable interferences with the subject of the sale. Such warranties, it is
apprehended, are of rare occurrence. The authority of an agent
to make them is not inferable from" a naked Peneral authority to
sell."
And in Richmond, &c., Co., v. Farquar,8 Blackf. (Ind.) 89,
it was held, that the power given by the seller of certain sacks
of wool, to one to weigh and deliver them does not authorize him
to warrant as to the quality of the wool. See also Smith v. Tracy,
36 N. Y. 79 ; -Dodd v. Barlow, supra.
When the contract of sale and warranty is completed, the authority
of the agent usually ends, for "it does not follow that if a person
is authorized to sell the property, his agency continues, so as to
permit him to rescind the sale or adjust the damages which the
vendee may sustain by a breach of the warranty. The transaction
is complete by the sale, and the rights of the parties have become
vested, the one in the thing sold, and the other in the price." Per
COLLIER, C. J., in Bradford v. Bush, 10 Ala. 387.
II. THE CONTRACT OF WARRANTY.
(a) Sales.-It is not necessary, in order to constitute a warranty,
that the seller should use the word "warrant :" Hawking v. Pemberton, 51 N. Y. 198 ; Roberts v. Morgan, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) 488 ;
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O'Neal v. Bacon, 1 Houst. (Del.) 219; Weimer v. Clement, 37
Pa. St. 147 ; Randall v. Thornton, 43 Me. 226 ; Osgood v. Lewis,
2 H. & G. (Md.) 495; Patrick v. Leach, 8 Neb. 530; Kinley v.
Bitzpatricek, 4 How. (Miss.) 59 ;aHacwkins v. Berry, 10 Ill. 39;
Carter v. Black, 46 Mo. 385; and no particular form of words is
necessary: Weimer v. Clement, 37 Pa. St. 147; Blythe v. Speake,
23 Texas 429 ; Carter v. Black, 46 Mo. 384; but any positive
and unequivocal representation or affirmation made by the seller
during the treaty of sale with respect to the subject-matter thereof,
upon which the buyer would naturally be induced to rely, and
upon which he actually does rely in making his purchase, is sufficient to constitute a warranty. See Hastingsv. Lovering, 2 Pick.
(Mlass.) 214; Renshaw v. Robins, 9 Metc. (Mass.) 88; Blythe v.
Speake, 23 Texas 429; Bishop v. Small, 63 Me. 12; Beeman v.
Buck, 3 Vt. 53 ; Carley v. Wilkins, 6 Barb. (N. Y.) 557; Cha man v. i.lurch, 19 John. (N. Y.) 290; Durfee v. Mason, 8 Cowen
(N. Y.) 25 ; He~arland v. -rewman, 9 Watts (Pa.) 55 ; Me Gregor
v. Penn, 9 Yerger (Tenn.) 74; Otts v. Alderson, 10 Sm. & M.
(Miss.) 476; Sweet v. Colgate, 20 John. (N. Y.) 203; Thorne v.
11e Feagh, 75 Ill. 81 ; Little v. Woodworth, 8 Neb. 281 ; Wilbur
v. Cartright,44 Barb. (N. Y.) 536; Weimer v. Clement, 37 Pa.
St. -147.
It follows, therefore, from what has just been said, that a mere
expression of opinion by the seller as to the value or quality of his
goods, or expressions used by him for the purpose of "puffing" his
wares, or words of description, do not constitute a warranty.
Thus, in Horton v. Green, 66 N. C. 596, in an action for a
breach of warranty, it appeared that the plaintiff said, "What will
you take for your mule ?" defendant replied, "$125." Plaintiff then
rejoined, "I can't give $125, but if it is all sound and all right,
I'll give $100." Defendant then said, "It is all sound and all
right, and I will take $100, if you will pay the money down."
Plaintiff then said, "I cannot pay the money down, but I'll give
$25 down and a note for the balance," to which defendant assented.
The court was requested to instruct the jury that what defendant
said was a warranty in law; but the court refused, and left the
question to the jury to decide, and the action of the court was
upheld on appeal. So in Willard v. Stevens, 24 N. H. 271, plaintiff offered the following note in evidence, "Bought one red horse
six years old, for one hundred and twenty-five dollars, which I war-
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rant sound and kind," and contended that the note was a warranty
of the age of the horse as well as of his soundness. But the court
held that the warranty did not extend to the horse's age, but that
the words, "six years old," were matter of description only. EASTorder to make the warranty apply to the age,
the contract must be divided. It must be held that the intention
was, first, to warrant the age by implication, and then to make an
express warranty of the soundness and kindness." In illorrill v.
Wallace, 9 N. H. 111, plaintiff purchased eight hundred and
forty-eight pounds of lean pork, inquiring at the same time of the
plaintiff whether it was good, as there appeared to be some unfavorable appearances in it. Defendant stated that it was good, and
was not aware at the time of the fact of its being tainted. In an
action, the pork turning out bad, the court instructed the jury that
this constituted a warranty, and on appeal a new trial was granted,
as the judge who tried the case thought it should have been left to
the jury to say whether the expressions of the vendor were a warranty or merely an expression of judgment, though the rest of the
court thought the verdict might be supported.
See, also, Smith v. Justice, 13 Wise. 600; Zerr v. Shrader, 1
Weekly Notes of Cases (Phila.), 33; Beals v. Olmstead, 24 Vt.
115; Baird v. liatthews, 6 Dana (Ky.) 131; Towell v. Gatewood,
2 Scam. (Ill.) 22; .Hillman v. Wilcox, 30 Me. 170; _Foggart v.
Blackweller, 4 Ired. 238; Wolcott v. Mount, 38 N. J. 496; Baum
v. Stevens, 2 Ired. (N. 0.) 411; Clark v. Balls, 50 Iowa 275;
Greenthalv. Schneider, 52 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 133; Inge v. Bond,
3 Hawks (N. C.) 101; Byrne v. Jansen, 50 Cal. 624; Ayres v.
Parks, 3 Hawks (N. C.) 59; Jackson v. Crane, 61 Ga. 392;
-fcarland v. Newman, 9 Watts (Pa.) 55 ; Baker v. Fawkes, 35
U. C. Q. B. 302; Bryce v. Parker, 11 S. 0. 337; Swett v. Colgate, 20 John. (N. Y.) 203.
It also follows that the contract of warranty must be made pending the treaty of sale, and therefore any representations made prior
to the treaty as mere inducement to buy, will not be held to constitute a warranty, as thus for example in Jackson v. Wetherill, 7
S. & R. (Pa.) 480, the seller of a mare said repeatedly to the
buyer before the sale that he was "sure she was perfectly safe, kind
and gentle in harness," and in an action on the warranty, the court,
on appeal, held these words not to constitute a warranty; and
DUNCAn, J., said the seller "might have very truly said that he
MAN, J., said, "in
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was sure she was perfectly gentle in harness without any deceit.
It was an expression and a pretty strong one, I admit, of his judgment and opinion, and, if the cortrary were known to him, would
give a cause of action very different from a warranty." See,
also, Craig v. Miller, 22 U. C. C. P. 348. Where the contract of sale is reduced to writing, all prior representations are
considered to be merged in the written contract, and parol evidence
will not be admitted to vary or add to the written instrument. An
illustration of this principle is had in Bandall & Co. v. Rhodes, 1
Curt. C. C. 90. Here R. & Co. purchased of Rhodes, through
Brown, Rhodes' agent, the bark Baltic, supposing it to be of white
oak, as Brown asserted to them that it was, and the following note
was signed by the buyer, and a similar one by the seller, viz. :
"Sold to R. & Co. this day, through Brown, the bark Baltic, now
at East Boston, for $12,000, to be paid next Tuesday, as follows:
* * * Full packages of beef, &c., to be taken out by the owners,
all other small stores belonging to the vessel." The breach was
that the vessel turned out not to be built of white oak. The notes
were put in evidence, and plaintiffs attempted to prove the representations of Brown, which were rejected by the court, on the
ground that the whole contract was embraced in the above notes.
CURnTIS, J., said: "Now, the general rule is, that when negotiations have terminated in a written contract, the parties thereby
tacitly affirm that such writing contained the whole contract, and
no new terms are allowed to be added to it by extraneous evidence.
It is argued that this memorandum is not the written contract of
sale; that it only contains a statement of the fact that a sale has
been made and a description of the thing sold, the price and the
terms of the credit. But this is all that is necessary to make a
complete contract of sale; and to assume that anything more
existed, and allow it to be shown, would violate the rule above
stated. It is true, that in Bradford v. Manly, 18 Mass. R. 139,
and Hastings v. Lovering, 2 Pick. 214, it was held that a bill of
parcels was not the contract of sale, it being intended, as the court
says, in the first of those cases, only as a receipt for the price and
not to show the terms of the bargain. But here the writing could
not have been intended for a receipt, and must have been intended
to set forth, what it does set forth, a contract of sale, and if so,
it must be taken to embrace the whole contract, and consequently
a warranty was not one of its terms." See, also, Lamb v. Crofts,
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12 Mete. (Mass.) 353; 'Fan Ostrand v. Reed, 1 Wend. (N. Y.)
424; Galpin v. Atwater, 29 Con. 93; Pender v. -obes, 1 D. &
B. (N. 0.) 250; Bond v. Clark, 35 Vt. 577; iITullain v. Thomas,
43 Vt. 252.
Where, however, the writing is a mere memorandum of the contract or receipt, and does not contain all the terms of the contract,
parol evidence is admissible to explain or qualify, &c., the writing
Thus, in Towell v. Gatewood, 2 Scam. (Ill.) 23, the receipt ran:
"Mr. E. H. Gatewood bought of H. & I. Towell, two thousand
nine hundred and fifty-one pounds good, first and second rate
tobacco at $4.56, at $132.791. Received payment by the hands
of L. Kirkham. H. T.-I. T.," and the court, on appeal, said
they " could not consider the paper in question as containing the
evidence of the bargain entered into by the parties. It possesses
none of the constituent parts of a contract, but is, in form and in
fict, a bill of parcels, and an acknowledgment of the receipt of the
purchase-money, and as such was properly received in evidence;
but it does not follow that because it is evidence as far as it goes,
it is all the evidence that ought to be received." See, also,
Bradford v. .lfanly, 13 Mass. 139; -astings v. Lovering, 2 Pick.
(Mass.) 214 ; Hogins v. Plympton, 11 Id. 97 ; ilkins v. W 'hyland,
24 Barb. (N. Y.) 379; Mevrick v. Bradley, 19 Md. 50. The
following cases are a few illustrations of what writings the courts
have held to be descriptive, and what to constitute a warranty.
In Wason v. Rowe, 16 Vt. 525, the bill of sale was: "W. bought
of E. R., one bay horse, five years old last July, consideredsound.
Price $65. Received payment, E. R.," and was held not to constitute a warranty of soundness.
In Howell v. Cowles, 6 Grat. (Va.) 393, H. hired a negro from
C. to work for a year, and gave C. his bond, which bound the
hirer to pay on a certain day, "$135, being for the hire of a negro
man, the present year, by the name of Tom, to work at boat business, said negro to be clothed," &c., and it was held the words to
work at boat business were words of description merely.
But in Cramer v. Bradshaw, 10 John. (N. Y.) 484, where, by
a bill of sale, B. bargained, sold; granted, &c., "a negro
woman slave named, &c., being of sound wind and limb, and free
from all disease," the court held these words not to be descriptive,
but to be an averment of a fact, and in consequence to constitute
a warranty of soundness.
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So, also, a representation made subsequent to the sale, will not
constitute a warranty, unless, indeed, there be a new consideration,
as in Congar v. Chamberlain, 14 Wisc. 258, where A., having
agreed to deliver fruit trees to B. early in the fall, to be sent to
certain places in Minnesota before the frost set in, delivered them so
late that B. refused to accept them, and thereupon A. assured B.
that there was ample time to transport them before the frost, and
that if they were frozen they would come out uninjured in the
spring, if B. buried in a particular way, upon which B. agreed to
take them, andI the court held that this was a warranty founded on a
good consideration. See, also, Summers v. 'aughan,35 Ind. 323 ;
Towell v. Gatewood, 2 Scam. (Ill.) 22; Bloss v. KEittrdge, 5 Vt.
28; Vincent v. Leland, 100 Mass. 432.
It was held, however, in Wilson v. Ferguson, Cheves (S. C.)
190, that a warranty of soundness given after the sale was complete, being under seal, could not be impeached for want of consideration.
It has been frequently decided that a warranty does not extend to
defects in the article sold that are plainly visible to the purchaser,
*or which would be visible to him if he should examine the article
as an ordinarily prudent buyer should: Palmer v.* Skillenger, 5
Harr. (D61.) 233; Chadsey v. Greene, 24 Conn. 562; Scarborough v. Beynolds, 13 Richardson 98; House v. Bort, 4
Blackf. (Ind.) 296; Hill v. North, 34 Vt. 604; Williams v.
Ingram, 21 Texas 300 ; Ricks v. Dillahunty, 8 Port. (Ala.) 134;
Huston v. Plato, 3 Col. 402; Sehiiyler v. Buss, 2 Caines Term
R. (N. Y.) 202; Vandewalker v. Osmer, 65 Barb. (N. Y.)
556; Richardson v. Johnson, 1 La. Ann. 389; Fisher v. Pollard, 2 Head. (Tenn.) 314; Dean v. lHlorey, 33 Iowa 120 ; ilulvany v. Rosenbergqer, 18 Pa. St. 203; Birdseye v. Frost, 34
Barb. (N. Y.) 367; Brown v. Bigelow, 10 Allen (Mass.) 242.
But a seller may warrant against visible defects.
Thus in Pinney v. Andrus, 41 Vt. 631, it was held that a warranty against the foot-rot in sheep was valid, whether the existence
of the disease was obvious or even known to the buyer when he
made the purchase; and'in KYenner v. Harding, 85 Ill. 264,
where the seller of a mare and mule had them stabled together in
a single stall, and assured the buyer, when about to examine them,
that the mule was sound, upon which they were bought, and the
mule's pastern joints at the time were crooked over, and it was
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lame, the court held the warranty to extend to the lameness. See,
also, 1 Parsons on Contracts, 576, note h.
It was formerly supposed that there could be no warranty
against a future event, but it seems that now the law is otherwise,
though it is difficult to find authorities that decide the point. On
principle, there is apparently no reason why a man should not warrant against a future event.
In Osborn v. Nicholson, 13 Wall. 654, a slave-owner, in 1861,
sold a slave, taking from the purchaser a note for $1300, and the
following bill of sale was executed: "For the consideration of
$1300, I hereby transfer all the right, title and interest I have to
a negro boy named Albert, aged about twenty-three years. I warrant said negro to besound in body and mind, and a slave for life;
and I also warrant the title to said boy clear and perfect."
In 1869, on a suit on the note, the defendant pleaded the warranty, and that the warranty having been violated by the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which
liberated the slave, the plaintiff ought not to recover. To this
plaintiffs demurred, and the court overruled the demurrer. On
appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, the action of
the lower court was reversed, and the Supreme Court held, the
action lay, on the ground that though a warranty against a future
event is valid, yet, an ordinary warranty of title and quiet possession, such as the above, never was contemplated to extend to and
such sovereign act as the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment,
and, therefore, was not violated by the loss of the slave, by virtue
of the said amendment. The reader is also referred to the cases of
Hambright v. Stover, 31 Ga. 300; Bichardson v. 1liason, 53
Barb. (N. Y.) 601; Leggat v. Sands, c., 60 Ill. 158, which all
seem to recognise the validity of a warranty of a future event.
A warranty is a question of intention, and it is the province of
the jury to determine the weight and effect to be attached to the
verbal affirmations and representations of the seller: Ayres v.
Parks, 3 Hawks (N. C.) 60; Baum v. Stevens, 2 Ired. (N. C.)
411; Alexander v. Dutton, 58 N. II. 282; Baker v. Fawkes, 35
U: C. Q. B. 302; Bennet v. Tregent, 24 U. C. 0. P. 565;
Boothby v. Scales, 27 Wise. 626; Bradford v. Bush, 10 Ala. 386;
Ihuffee v. 1lfason, 8 Cowen (N. Y.) 25; Chisholm v. Proudfoot,
15 U. 0. Q. B. 203; Poggartv. Blackweller, 4.Ired. (N. C.) 238;
.Horn v. Buck, 46 Md. 358; Humphreys v. Comline, 8 Blackf.
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(Ind.) 516; Henson v. King, 3 Jones (N. C.) 419; Foster v.
Caldwell, 18 Vt. 180; Kinley v. Fitzpatrick, 4 How. (Miss.) 59;
.Murray v. Smith, 4 Daly (N. Y.) 278; McDonald v. Thomas,
53 Iowa 559; Morrill v. Wallace, 9 N. H. 111; III-carland v.
NYewman, 9 Watts (Pa.) 57; Rogers v. Ackerman, 22 Barb. (N.
Y.) 134; Brown v. Bigelow, 10 Allen (Mass.) 243; Caldwell v.

Wallace, 4 S. & P. (Ala.) 282; Duff v. Ivy, 3 Stew. (Ala.) 140;
Cowan v. Silliman, 4 Dev. (N. C.) 46; McGregor v. Penn, 9
Yerger (Tenn.) 74; Cook v. lifoseley, 13 Wend. (N. V.) 277; Jack
et al. v. B. B. Co., 53 Iowa 399; .Nelson v. Biggers, 6 Ga. 205;
Thorne v. Mife Treagh, 75 Ill. 81; Warren v. Phila. .c., Co., 83
Pa. St. 437 ; Horton v. Green, 66 N. C. 596; Starnes v. Erwin,
10 Ired. (N. C.) 226. But where the contract has been reduced
to writing it is usually a question for the court to pass upon its
interpretation: Horn v. Buck, 48 Md. 358; Osgood v. Lewis, 2
H. & G. 495; Claghorn v. Lingo, 62 Ala. 230; Wason v. Rowe,
16 Vt. 525. The following cases are a few illustrations of the
constructions of warranties : in Blythe v. Speake, 23 Texas 429,
it was held that, a bill of sale, granting, &c., "a negro man, slave
for life, by the name of Sam, about twenty-eight or thirty years
old, sane and healthy (except one finger stiff), in mind and body,"
constituted a warranty of soundness; and that, though the bill
concluded with a warranty applicable to title only: see Duff v.
Ivy, infra.
In Cook v. Moseley, 13 Wend. (N. Y.) 277, Moseley asked
Cook, if the mare was lame, and he answered she was not lame,
and that he would not be afraid to warrant her, that she was
sound every way, as far as he knew. In a suit for breach of
warranty, the mare being proved to have been lame, the justice,
before whom the case was heard, gave judgment for the plaintiff,
which was affirmed by the Court of Common Pleas, and Court of
Appeals, SUTHERLAND, J., saying, he thought enough was said to
amount to a warranty.
In Starnes v. Erwin, 10 N. C. 226, plaintiff desiring to purchase an interest in a gold mine, asked the price, and defendant
replied $100, and said: " but for the death of my wife, Iwould
not take that price; if you buy, I will warrant you to make the
money in ten days. Come up in a few days and we will look at
it." Plaintiff said, the shaft is full of water, I will buy it on your
honor. And defendant said, if you will do the work I will war-
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rant yoiu will make your money in ten days. Plaintiff said, -Twill do
it. The jury found for the defendant, on a suit on the warranty, and
on appeal this was upheld. The court remarked, that the judge
below instructed the jury that if from the whole conversation, they
should conclude "that the word warrantwas used as a word of high
commendation and praise, so as to induce the trade, and not as
importing an undertaking to make good in damages if the money
was not made in ten days, the defendant would not be liable in this
action," and this was substantially correct.
In McJarland v. Vewman, 9 Watts (Pa.) 55, the court below
charged the jury that "a positive averment, made by the defendant
at the time of the contract, of a material fact, is a warranty:
that it is part and parcel of the contract." Held on appeal to
be error. GIBsON, J., said: "The naked averment of a fact is
not a warranty,

*

*

*

the jury must be satisfied from the

whole, that the vendor actually and not constructively consented
to be bound for the truth of his representations, * * * but a
naked affirmation is not to be dealt with as a warranty, merely
because the vendee had. gratuitously relied on it." See P2oster v.
enner v. HEarding, 85
Caldwell, 18 Vt. 176; but see also
Ill. 26.
In D uff v. Ivy, 3 Stew. (Ala.) 140, a receipt running: ":Received
of A. D., * * * for a negro named Charity, which I warrant

and defend unto the said D.," was held to constitute a warranty
of soundness and title; see, however, Bowan v. Silleman, 4 Ired.
(N. C.) 46.
In Stroud v. Pierce, 6 Allen (Iass.) 416, the ruling of the
court below was that, "a representation that a piano-forte is well
made and up to concert pitch, is a representation of fact, which,
if proved to be false, as between a seller making the representation
and a buyer relying upon it, would authorize the buyer to recover."
On appeal, CHAPMAN, J., said: "The word representation was
undoubtedly used here as synonymous with affirmation, and there
can be no doubt that such an affirmation is a warranty. * * *
The defendant contends that it should have been left to the jury to
find whether this language was used with the intention of affirming the fact, or of expressing an opinion. But the intent of the
party is immaterial."
The following diseases have been considered to constitute a
breach of warranty of soundness in the sales of horses: "The

EXPRESS WARRANTIES IN SALES OF

navicular disease :" Huston v. Plato, 3 Col. 402 ; "bl i n dness
in one eye :" House v. Fort, 4 Blackf. (Ind.) 294; " defective
eye :" Burton v. Young, 5 Harr. (Del.) 233; in short, "any
disease, deformity or defect which renders the horse less fit for
present use and convenience, and not openly and palpably visible," would probably amoint to a breach of warranty of soundness: Roberts v. Jenkins, 21 N. H. 116; Burton v. Young,
supra; " cribbiting," affecting the health: Washburn v. Cuddihy,
8 Gray (Mass.) 430; "permanent lameness :' Brown v. Bigelow,
10 Allen (Mass.) 242; "the glanders:" Woodbury v. Bobbins,
10 Cush. (Mass.) 520; "Corns :" Alexander v. -Dutton, 58 N. H.
282. "A warranty that a horse is ' sound and right,' is violated
by his being a ' cribber:'" Walker v. Hoisington, 43 Vt. 608.
See also Kenner v. Harding, 85 Ill. 264; _forrill v. Bemis, 37
Vt. 15; Zimmerman v. Morrow, 28 Minn. 367.
It frequently occurs that the express contract of warranty is
modified or, varied by the implied contract of usage of trade, that
is to say, under certain circumstances an implied contract of usage
enters into and becomes an element in the original contract of the
parties. The principles in regard to the question of the implied
contract of usage of trade, with respect to warranties, fall more
appropriately under the head of implied contracts of warranty and
are there discussed, and it will be sufficient here to give one case as
an example of the subject. The case of lJarshallv. Perry, 67 Me.
78, is. a fair illustration of the principles of law that, in the United
States, have been laid down with respect to usage. In that case,
in an action for the price of a lot of butter, the defendant claimed
a rebate in consequence of a breach of warranty of the quality of
the butter; but the plaintiff insisted that, whether there was a
ivarranty or not, defendant was impliedly bound by a usage of the
trade at the place, to the effect that he was bound either to
return the goods or give notice of the breach of warranty within a
specified time, which, in this case, had admittedly not been done.
The defendant was apparently ignorant of the usage. Held, overruling the court below, that the defendant was not bound by the
usage.
The court said: " The decisions as to the effect of
usage upon contracts are not uniform; but we think the current
of authorities in this country, both sate and federal, establishes
the proposition that local usage cannot be shown to contradict or
vary the terms of a contract, express or implied, by law, or control
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its interpretation and effect. Upon a careful examination of the
cases apparently in conflict, it will be found that they do not differ
so much in legal principles as in their application to particular
cases. * * * Under the contract of warranty claimed by defendants, the rights and liabilities of the parties were fixed and well
defined by the general principles of the common law. To authorize the defendants to maintain an action for breach of warranty, it
was not necessary that they should examine the butter at once.
* * * If they knew the usage * * * and made an express contract of warranty, it must be presumed that they were not satisfied
with their rights and liabilities under the usage, and therefore made
the express contract. * * * The usage was local. If not known
to the parties, it could in no event affect their rights and liabilities."
The following cases were cited by the court: Dickinson v. Gay, 7
Allen (Mass.) 29; Dodd v. Farlow, 11 Id. 426; Potter v.
Smith, 103 Mass. 68; Davis v. Gallou2pe, 111 Id. 121; Brown
v. Foster, 113 Id. 136; Haskins v. Warren, 115 Id. 514;
Collender v. Dinsmore, 55 N. Y. 200; Coxe v. Heisley, 19 Pa.
St. 243; Wetherill v. Neilson, 20 Id. 448; Barnardv. Kellogg,
10 Wall. 383 ; Randall v. Smith, 63 Me. 105; Packardv. Earle,
113 Mass. 280; Walls v. Bailey, 49 N. Y. 464; Fisher v. Sargent, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 250; Dodge v. Favor, 15 Gray (Mass.) 82.
An express warranty usually precludes the idea of an implied
warranty, on the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius:
Wood v. Ashe, 1 Strobh. (S. 0.) 407; Duff v. Ivy, 3 Stew.
(Ala.) 140; Stucky v. Clyburn, Cheves (S.0.) 186.
In Wells v. $pears, 1 McO. (S.C.) 421, however, it was said
that, though the above was the general rule, yet, there were certain
exceptions to it; and the court held that an express warranty of
title did not exclude an implied warranty of soundness. See, also,
Hughes v. Banks, Id. 537.
But a man may make an express warranty, where one would be
implied, if nothing had been said: Gill v. Kaufman, 16 Kan.
571.
(b) .Exchange.-Inan exchange as well as a sale, it is not
necessary to use the word warrant to bind the seller by a warranty,
but the same rule that applies to sales governs exchanges in this
respect: Whitney v. Sutton, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) 411; so in Morgan
v. Powers, 66 Barb. (N. Y.) 35, it was held where, during the
negotiations for the exchange of a cow for a mare, defendant told
VoL.-XI.-72
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plaintiff that the mare could work well enough, and described
what work she actually did, that this was an affirmation of the
ability of the mare to work, and constituted a warranty.
III. REMEDIES OF THE PARTIES.

Of the remedies of the seller, little need be said, as the law
applicable to his right may be found fully discussed in any respectable book on contracts or sales. The remedies of the buyer, however, demand more consideration.
(a) Remedies of the buyer; avoidance of the contract by
fraud.-The buyer has several remedies against the seller, and
among the most common are those which are grounded on the
seller's deceit. As we have already seen, the universal rule applicable to sales of personal property in the absence of an express or
implied warranty is caveat emptor. But where the seller knowingly makes any false and nMaterial representations with respect to
the subject-matter of the sale, the rule of caveat emptor no longer
applies, but the buyer may refuse to receive the goods, or offer to
return them when received, and rescind the contract because of the
deceit, and if he has paid the price, recover it back : Kimball v.
Cunningham, 4 Mass. 502; Cozzins v. Whitaker, 3 S. & P.
(Ala.) 322; Boorman et al. v. Jenkins, 12 Wend. (N. Y.)
566 ; Jack et al. v. R. B. Co., 53 Iowa 399 ; Blythe v. Speake, 23
Texas 430; Stroud v. Pierce, 6 Allen (Mass.) 413; Pfreyman
v. Knecht, 78 Pa. St. 141. He may also retain the goods and, in
an action for the price, avoid the plaintiff's right to recover by proof
of the deceit and worthless character of the goods; or if the
goods are not wholly worthless, he may show a diminution in
their value in mitigation of damages. See Beecker et al. v.
Frooman,13 Johns. (N. Y.) 302; and cases, infra. Or, finally, he
may retain the goods and bring an action on the deceit: see Loomis
v. Cromwell, 8 Law Rep. 546; Oozzins v. Whitaker, 3 S. & P.
(Ala.) 322; Blythe v. Speake, 23 Texas 430; Me Farland v.
_Newman, 9 Watts (Pa.) 55. And ithas been decided that, though
ordinarily parol evidence is not admissible to vary a written con4
tract, yet where there is an allegation of fraud, such evidence will
not necessarily be excluded, when it is offered to prove that the
written evidence was fraudulently obtained : Cozzins v. Whitaker,
3 S. & P. (Ala.) 322. It is hardly necessary to add that where
the buyer rescinds and returns the goods for the fraud of the seller,
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he must do so within a reasonable time. See -Draperv. Sweet, 66
Barb. (N. Y.) 145; Horn v. Buck, 48 Md. 358.
Where the buyer maintains a defence to an action for the price
of goods on the ground of fraud, the same facts must be proved
which would be necessary to maintain an action for damages for
deceit in the sale of goods; see King v. .aqle Mills, 10 Allen
(Mass.) 541. That is to say, the representation of the seller must
be false, and it must also be proved that he knew of its falsity; see
preceding case, also Bond v. Clark, 35 Vt. 577. The question
was discussed at considerable length by STORY, J., in Rough v.'
Richardson, 3 Story 659, and at page 690, he said: "And here
it is important to state that both facts must concur; there must be
false and material representations, and the purchaser must have
purchased upon the faith and credit of such representations. It is
not necessary that he should have solely relied on these representations. It is sufficient if they constituted a part of the res gestce,
upon which he relied and without which the purchase would not
have been made. There is another consideration applicable to the
circumstances of the present case, which is fully sustained by the
case of Atwood v. Small, in the House of Lords (6 C1. & Fin.
232), and which, perhaps, cannot be more briefly expressed than
it has been, with a slight addition, in the marginal note of the
reporters. If, upon a treaty for the sale of property, the vendor
makes representations (touching the nature and character and value
of that property) which he knows to be false, the falsehood of
which the purchaser has no means of knowing, but he relies on
them, a court of equity will rescind a contract so entered into,
although it may not contain the misrepresentations. But it will
noi rescind without the clearest proof of the fraudulent misrepresentations, and that they were made under such circumstances as show
that the contract was based on them. But if a purchaser, choosing to judge for himself, does not avail himself of the knowledge
or means of knowledge open to him or to his agents, he cannot be
heard to say, that he was deceived by the vendor's misrepresentations, the rule being caveat emptor, and the knowledge of his
agents being as binding upon him as his own knowledge. Now,
this doctrine is, in both its aspects, just as true as to gross misrepresentations, made by mistake, going to the essence of the bargain,
as it is to the misrepresentation founded in fraud. I do not say,
morally, but in construction of law. If the purchaser relies on
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them and is deceived, he does not buy what he intended, and he
is misled to do what he would not otherwise have done. But then,
on the other hand, in cases of mistake, the bargain must have been
made in strict faith and reliance upon such gross misrepresentations; and if the purchaser has acted upon.-his own judgment,
uninfluenced by such misrepresentations, and has within his immediate reach full means of knowledge, and has declined to use those
means, then he has no right to complain of his bargain. And here
again the proof should be clear that there has been gross misrepresentations, and that the purchaser has been seduced into the bargain by them." The reader is also referred to the following cases
for illustrations, and the language the courts have used upon the
subject: Hadley v. Clinton, de., Co., 13 Ohio St. 502; Stroud v.
Pierce, 6 Allen (Mass.) 413 ; Stone v. Denny, 4 Metc. (Mass.) 151 ;
Osgood v. Lewis, 2 Md. 495; Blythe v. Speake, 23 Texas 430;
Patrick v. Leach, 8 Neb. 530 ; Larey v. Taliaferro, 57 Ga. 443 ;
Bank v. Thayer, 7 Fed. Rep. 622 ; Wermer v. Olement, 37 Pa.
St. 143; Lord v. Grow, 39 Id. 88.
In -Ellisv. Andrews, 56 N. Y. 83, however, it was held that a
false statement, which the seller knowingly made with reference to
the value of an article for the purpose of obtaining a higher price,
would not sustain an action for fraud, by the purchaser who relied
on it, on the ground that there is a broad distinction between a
false affirmation of quality, or title, or soundness, and mere value,
as in respect to the latter the purchaser must always be his own
judge.
(b) Actions for breach of warranty.-Where there is no evidence
of fraudulent representation but the seller is guilty of a breach of
an express warranty, the buyer may proceed against him in an
action on the case for the tort, or in assumpsit for breach of contract, immediately on the breach: Freyman v. Kneeht, 78 Pa. St.
141 ; TFail v. Strong, 10 Vt. 457; Bennett v. Tregent, 24 U. C.
0. P. 565 ; but in the case of an express warranty a scienter need
not be laid, and need not be proved. See House v. Fort,4 Blackf.
(Ind.) 293; Ross v. Zather, 47 Barb. 582; Chisholm v. Proudfoot, 15 U. 0. Q. B. 203; Vanlear v. Earle, 26 Pa. St. 277.
To entitle the plaintiff to recover in an action for an alleged
breach of warranty, it is not necessary to return the goods : Hforn
v. Buck, 48 Md. 358; Vincent v. Leland, 100 Mass. 432; Polhemus v. Heiman, 45 Cal. 573 ; Thompson v. Botts, 8 Mo. 710 ;
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Hughes v. Banks, 1 Mco.

(S. C.) 537; Douglass 3ff g Co. v.

Gardner, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 88; Waring v. Mason, 18 Wend.
(N. Y.) 425; Muller v. Eno, 14 N. Y. 597; Bust v. Pokler, 41
Id. 488; Day v. Pool, 52 Id. 416; and in an action for the price,
the defendant may give in evidence the breach of a warranty in
diminution of damages and retain the goods: Steigleman v.
Jeffries, 1 S. & R. (Pa.) 476; Polhemus v. Heiman, 45 Cal. 573;
Perley v. Baleh, 23 Pick. (Mass.) 283.
In some states for a breach of an express warranty, in the absence
of fraud the buyer may rescind the contract and return the goods
as in Massachusetts. See Bryant v. Isburgh, 13 Gray (Mass.)
607. In other states, however, the rule seems to be the other way,
and the remedy is on the warranty alone, and in the absence of
fiaud the buyer cannot rescind the contract. See Kase v. John,
10 Watts (Pa.) 107; Preyman v. Knecht, 78 Pa. St. 141; Bust
v. Bekler, 41 N. Y. 488; Day v. Pool, 52 N. Y. 416; Reed v.
Bandall, 29 N. Y. 358.
IV. MEASURE Op DAMAGE.-The measure of damage where
the goods have not been returned, for a breach of warranty, is the
difference between the actual value of the article sold, and the
value of the article, had it conformed to the warranty: Tuttle v.
Brown, 4 Gray (Mass.) 457; Loomis v. Cromwell, 8 Law Rep.
546; Pinney v. Andrus, 41 Vt. 632; Preyman v. Knecht, 78 Pa.
St. 141; Thornton v. Thompson, 4 Grat. (Va.) 121; Moulton v.
Sruton, 39 Me. 287; Cary v. Gruman, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 625;
Beggio v. Braggiotti, 7 Cush. (Mass.) 166; Cothers v. Keever, 4
Pa. St. 168 ; Tatum v. 3Aohr, 21 Ark. 351 ; and it has been held
that the price paid is strong evidence of -what the article would
have been worth, if sound: Cary v. Gruman, supra; Thornton v.
Thompson, supra; Beggio v. Braggiotti, supra. Where the
goods have been returned, the measure of damage would be the
whole price. See Kimball v. Cunningham, 4 Mass. 502; Conner
v. Henderson, 15 Mass. 319. So also where the goods prove
utterly worthless the same rule would probably apply: see Williamson v. Carnaday, 3 Ired. (N. 0.) 349; Conner v. Henderson,
supra. Where the seller sues for the price, the buyer may, as we
have .sen, prove the breach of warranty, in reduction of damages:
Harringtonv. Stratton, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 510; Mixer v. Coburn,
11 Mete. (Mass.) 561; .Dorr v. .Fisher, 1 Cush. (Mass.) 271.

